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- Interim Update 14th April 2010
Copyright
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Beware of analysts bearing equations
In
general, when an analyst uses an equation to make a point about where
the economy is headed and/or what economic policies are required, you
should immediately stop reading or listening. By directing your
attention away from the equation-happy analyst you will run the risk of
being uninformed, but if you continue reading/listening then you will
very likely be misinformed. It is usually better to have no information
than to have the wrong information.
In the past we've discussed the problems with the famous Equation of
Exchange (PT = MV). The equation is of little value outside the
classroom and can be dangerous if used to determine the appropriate
monetary or fiscal policy. Another of these inherently useless
equations that can be dangerous in the wrong hands is called the
"National Income Accounting Identity". This equation is typically
expressed with lots of variables -- as G - T = (M - X) + (Y - T - (C +
I)), for instance -- but it boils down to: net private savings =
government balance (government spending minus taxation) + current
account balance. For an example of how this equation can be used to
come up with wrongheaded conclusions and policy recommendations, refer
to pages 5-7 of the report linked HERE.
The writer of the afore-linked report tries to use the National Income
Accounting Identity to show that higher government deficit-spending (a
greater "government balance") is needed to offset the private sector's
increasing desire to save.
Analysts who base their economics analyses on mathematical equations
usually fail to properly account for cause and effect. They see what's
on the surface, such as if one side of an equation rises then the other
side must also rise, but they fail to see that cause and effect are
inter-connected via such complex feedback mechanisms that their beloved
equation is useless in the real world. Considering that the real world
involves millions of people interacting to satisfy their myriad
individual desires, is it any wonder that the economy can't be properly
described by a mathematical equation?
An example of the sort of cause-and-effect feedback mechanism we are
referring to stems from the fact that the government can only increase
its spending by stealing (directly via taxation or indirectly via
inflation) or borrowing more from the private sector. Looking at it in
a slightly different way, if taxation is constant then the "government
balance" can only increase via the borrowing of more money from the
private sector or the central-bank monetisation of government debt
(counterfeiting). To argue, then, that the "government balance" needs
to grow in order to support the economy is, in effect, to argue that
the economy will benefit if the private sector is forced to buy more
government bonds or if the central bank counterfeits money on a grander
scale. To put it bluntly, increasing the "government balance" MUST have
negative consequences for the private sector.
The main cause of Japan's economic malaise (the main reason why the
Japanese economy has performed so poorly since 1990) is the massive
increase in the "government balance" and the resultant massive
non-productive investment of private savings in government bonds. And
yet, many analysts (including the writer of the above-linked report)
are now advocating that US policy-makers increase the "government
balance". If they don't have a viable economic theory to lean on, you'd
think they would at least be able to learn from the historical record.
Unfortunately, not only have they not learned from the historical
record, they have generally learned exactly the wrong things. A classic
example is the common belief that when the Fed tightened monetary
policy during 1936-1937 it CAUSED the US economy to plunge back into
depression, the implication being that the economy would have been just
fine if not for the Fed's 'premature' tightening. The real problem was
that the preceding (1933-1936) recovery was an illusion created by
monetary and fiscal "stimulus". With the recovery being based on loose
money and government spending rather than on profit-seeking investment,
it was destined to collapse in a heap as soon as the "stimulus" was
wound back. The alternative would have been to keep the "stimulus"
going until the currency was destroyed.
Why, we wonder, have no lessons been learned from the economic downturn
of the early 1920s? By a number of measures the first year of the
1920-1921 mini depression was worse than the first year of the
1930-1945 great depression. The main reason that the early-1920s
depression was over within 2 years and was followed by a lengthy period
of real economic progress appears to be that the government of the time
did the OPPOSITE of what the Keynesian playbook recommends.
Specifically, the government REDUCED its spending and its debt. Had the
Keynesians been in control in 1920 then the economics textbooks of
today would probably have a chapter devoted to the Great Depression of
the 1920s.
In summary, the popular view amongst high-profile pundits is that the
economy needs more government spending. Logic and the historical record
tell us that the opposite is actually true, but these pundits won't be
dissuaded because they have, in their possession, simple one-line
equations to 'prove' their case.
The conventional wisdom being what it is and being unlikely to change
anytime soon, we can reasonably expect that the trend towards a more
expansive (and expensive) government will continue. Consequently, we
should continue to put a lot of emphasis on gold-related investments.
We can't stop policy-makers from doing stupid things, but at least we
can profit from them.
An appropriate quote
In an address to Congressional Democrats in May of 1939, Henry Morgenthau, Franklin Roosevelt's Treasury Secretary, lamented: "We
have tried spending money. We are spending more than we have ever spent
before and it does not work. And I have just one interest, and if I am
wrong ... somebody else can have my job. I want to see this country
prosperous. I want to see people get a job. I want to see people get
enough to eat. We have never made good on our promises ... I say after
eight years of this Administration we have just as much unemployment as
when we started ... And an enormous debt to boot!"
Similar sentiments have probably been expressed in the Japanese
language over the past decade, and yet the same ill-conceived policies
continue.
The Stock Market
Current Market Situation
The article at http://news.goldseek.com/GoldSeek/1270833600.php
makes the case that due to various interventions and inflationary
policies, a multi-month correction over the next few months could be
followed by a stock market "melt-up". This is clearly not our favoured
scenario, but we certainly can't rule it out. It is one of the reasons
why the risk/reward of being 'long' gold is much better than the
risk/reward of being 'short' the stock market. The stock market's
nominal trend can be turned from down to up via monetary inflation, but
its real trend cannot be.
Stock market sentiment has become very interesting indeed. For example,
the 10-day moving average of the equity put/call ratio just hit its
lowest level since September of 2000!
Sentiment is now far more optimistic than we thought it would get,
while the fundamental backdrop appears to be no better than expected.
This does not mean that the stock market will soon tank. We've
previously noted that important tops in the senior US stock indices
tend to be gradual processes rather than spikes. If anything, the high
level of bullish sentiment makes it even more likely that a gradual
topping process will occur, the reason being that a lot of bullish
traders will be looking to buy a pullback. Consequently, once a peak is
in place there will probably be an initial 5%-10% decline followed by a
rebound to 'test' the peak before the market begins to trend downward
with conviction.
We won't be surprised if the peak occurs within the next several
trading days, especially considering that a peak at this time would
line up with the average for the second year of the "Presidential
Cycle". If so, a test of the peak would likely occur during May.
Suggested Action
As mentioned in many previous commentaries, our view is that the best
way for the vast majority of people to deal with a high-risk market
environment is to build up a large cash reserve. This is certainly our
preferred approach. At times we will also buy some insurance in the
form of put options, but our option positions will always be very small
compared to our overall portfolio value. Currently, for example, our
total exposure to put options amounts to about 0.5% (half of one
percent) of our portfolio value. This exposure will possibly be
increased to as much as 2% of portfolio value over the next month or
so, depending on price action.
In order to hedge our base metals exposure our initial insurance
position is being built in Freeport McMoran (FCX) put options with a
January-2011 expiry. Another stock that could be a reasonable candidate
for a put-option position is Potash Corp. (NYSE: POT), solely because
of its chart pattern (see below). We have no knowledge of and no
opinion about the fundamentals of the potash business, but the chart
suggests considerable downside potential. The chart also shows that the
stock is 'oversold' on a short-term basis, so we would probably only
consider POT put options following a rebound to the vicinity of the
50-day moving average.
After we see evidence
that a top is in place we may suggest the purchase of an inverse index
fund or other bear fund, but at this stage we don't have anything
specific in mind.
Gold and
the Dollar
Gold
The June gold futures contract (see chart below) is consolidating below
resistance in the low-$1160s. The gold price could drop back to around
$1130 without doing any damage whatsoever to the 'technical' picture.
There's a good chance, we think, that the gold market will challenge its December-2009 peak within the coming month.
Below is a chart of
the BKX/SPX ratio (the banking sector relative to the broad stock
market). This has relevance to the gold market because relative
weakness in the financial establishment (as represented by the banks)
puts upward pressure on the gold price and relative strength in the
financial establishment puts downward pressure on the gold price. In
other words, one of the many forces that influence the gold price moves
inversely to the BKX/SPX ratio.
BKX/SPX has just moved up to near its high of the past 12 months.
Considering our gold market outlook it would make sense if the BKX was
now at, or very close to, a relative-strength peak.
Gold Stocks
In the email sent to subscribers in response to Tuesday's market action, we wrote:
"On Tuesday the HUI
dropped back to test support in the low-430s, and then rebounded. This
price action solidifies 430 as an important demarcation level.
We have been operating
under the assumption that the HUI's short-term upside potential was
limited by resistance at 470. While the area around 470 remains the
most likely place for the next short-term top, the price action of the
past week suggests the potential for a rise to near the December high
(520) over the coming month or so. Due to the increased upside
potential we are upgrading our short-term HUI outlook from "neutral" to
"bullish".
The broad stock market is
very extended to the upside and could reach an important peak at any
time. Consequently, we are concerned about overall stock market risk
and the effect that a sharp downturn in the broad market could have on
the gold sector. However, individual market analysis should always take
precedence over inter-market analysis, and in any case the risk
parameters are now defined in such a way that it will only take a small
amount of weakness from here to tell us that our short-term bullish
view on the HUI is wrong.
If the HUI closes below
430 within the next several days it will be a clear sign that we are
over-estimating the short-term upside potential. Our short-term bullish
stance is therefore predicated on the HUI remaining above 430 on a
daily closing basis."
Tuesday's pullback to support in the low-430s and the subsequent
rebound was a positive development, but, of course, there is no
guarantee that support will continue to hold.
From our perspective,
the ideal outcome would be for the HUI to spend another 2-5 trading
days 'horsing around' within the 430-450 range and to then resume its
advance.
Currency Market Update
The euro gapped higher on Monday in response to news that Europe's
monetary union had made a 30-billion-euro loan package available to
Greece. This news is unequivocally BEARISH for the euro because it sets
a bailout precedent. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the bailout
is not for Greece; it is, instead, for the German, French and other
banks that would be hurt if the Greek government defaulted on its debt.
In other words, this is yet another example of money being transferred
from the rest of the economy to cover up the bad investments made by
banks.
That the currency market took the bailout news as bullish is additional
evidence that the euro's short-term trend has changed from down to up
(when the price trend is up, most news is construed in a positive way).
Also, the June euro has broken above 1.36, which is the level we said
had to be cleared to confirm our suspicion that it had made a
short-term bottom late last month.
The following daily
chart of the Dollar Index provides more evidence that a short-term
trend change has occurred in the currency market.
As mentioned in
recent commentaries, 78.0-78.5 is a reasonable short-term downside
target for the Dollar Index and 1.42 is a reasonable short-term upside
target for the euro.
Update
on Stock Selections
(Notes: 1) To review the complete list of current TSI stock selections, logon at http://www.speculative-investor.com/new/market_logon.asp
and then click on "Stock Selections" in the menu. When at the Stock
Selections page, click on a stock's symbol to bring-up an archive of
our comments on the stock in question. 2) The Small Stock Watch List is
located at http://www.speculative-investor.com/new/smallstockwatch.html)
Khan Resources (TSX: KRI). Recent price: C$0.47
KRI's share price plunged on 13th-14th of April in response to a
company press release announcing that the licenses for its Dornod
uranium property had been revoked by a Mongolian Government agency. The
full story is contained in KRI's 13th April press release.
Reading between the lines, here's what we think has happened:
ARMZ, a Russian nuclear company, wants control of the assets currently
held by KRI. ARMZ tried to secure this control via a C$0.65/share
takeover bid, but this bid was trumped by a C$0.96/share offer from
CNNC (a Chinese nuclear company). Rather than get into a bidding war
with CNNC, ARMZ is now trying to gain control by political means and
has enticed the relevant Mongolian officials to invalidate KRI's
licenses. The idea is to get KRI and CNNC out of the picture at minimal
cost, after which a joint venture between ARMZ and the Mongolian
Government could proceed with exploitation of the Dornod resource.
Naturally, KRI is pursuing all legal remedies in an effort to get its
licenses revalidated. Also, the C$0.96/share CNNC bid is still on the
table, although the market is obviously convinced that it will be
withdrawn.
We don't know how this story will 'pan out', but we do think that KRI
would be a candidate for new buying if additional panic over the days
ahead pushed it down to the mid-C$0.30s. The reason is that the company
has about C$0.30/share of cash.
Chart Sources
Charts appearing in today's commentary
are courtesy of:
http://stockcharts.com/index.html
http://www.futuresource.com/

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