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   -- Weekly Market Update for the Week Commencing 25th February 2013

Big Picture View

Here is a summary of our big picture view of the markets. Note that our short-term views may differ from our big picture view.

In nominal dollar terms, the BULL market in US Treasury Bonds that began in the early 1980s will end by 2013. In real (gold) terms, bonds commenced a secular BEAR market in 2001 that will continue until 2014-2020. (Last update: 23 January 2012)

The stock market, as represented by the S&P500 Index, commenced a secular BEAR market during the first quarter of 2000, where "secular bear market" is defined as a long-term downward trend in valuations (P/E ratios, etc.) and gold-denominated prices. This secular trend will bottom sometime between 2014 and 2020. (Last update: 22 October 2007)

A secular BEAR market in the Dollar began during the final quarter of 2000 and ended in July of 2008. This secular bear market will be followed by a multi-year period of range trading. (Last update: 09 February 2009)

Gold commenced a secular bull market relative to all fiat currencies, the CRB Index, bonds and most stock market indices during 1999-2001. This secular trend will peak sometime between 2014 and 2020. (Last update: 22 October 2007)

Commodities, as represented by the Continuous Commodity Index (CCI), commenced a secular BULL market in 2001 in nominal dollar terms. The first major upward leg in this bull market ended during the first half of 2008, but a long-term peak won't occur until 2014-2020. In real (gold) terms, commodities commenced a secular BEAR market in 2001 that will continue until 2014-2020. (Last update: 09 February 2009)

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Outlook Summary

Market
Short-Term
(1-3 month)
Intermediate-Term
(6-12 month)
Long-Term
(2-5 Year)
Gold Bullish
(17-Oct-12)
Bullish
(26-Mar-12)
Bullish

US$ (Dollar Index) Neutral
(24-Dec-12)
Neutral
(09-Jan-12)
Neutral
(19-Sep-07)

Bonds (US T-Bond) Neutral
(12-Nov-12)
Neutral
(18-Jan-12)
Bearish
Stock Market (DJW) Bearish
(30-Jul-12)
Bearish
(28-Nov-11)
Bearish

Gold Stocks (HUI) Bullish
(24-Dec-12)
Bullish
(23-Jun-10)
Bullish

Oil Neutral
(30-Jul-12)
Neutral
(31-Jan-11)
Bullish

Industrial Metals (GYX) Neutral
(30-Jul-12)
Neutral
(29-Aug-11)
Neutral
(11-Jan-10)


Notes:

1. In those cases where we have been able to identify the commentary in which the most recent outlook change occurred we've put the date of the commentary below the current outlook.


2. "Neutral", in the above table, means that we either don't have a firm opinion or that we think risk and reward are roughly in balance with respect to the timeframe in question.

3. Long-term views are determined almost completely by fundamentals, intermediate-term views by fundamentals, sentiment and technicals, and short-term views by sentiment and technicals.

The Currency War Silliness

According to a common line of thinking, the reason that currency devaluation can't create a sustainable advantage for an economy is that it leads to competitive devaluation (the proverbial race to the bottom). The implication is that one economic region could achieve a sustainable advantage by devaluing its currency as long as its trading partners didn't implement offsetting devaluations. This is wrong. An economic region cannot obtain an advantage by deliberately reducing the value of its currency, regardless of how its trading partners react. Here's why:

Over the long term, currency exchange rates are determined by relative changes in purchasing power. This means that in order for Currency A to sustain a decline against Currency B on the foreign exchange market it will have to lose its domestic purchasing power at a faster rate. To put it another way, the so-called "general price level" will have to rise faster in Country A than in Country B. This, in turn, means that any international trade advantage that will theoretically -- if bad theory is applied -- be gained by a country due to a decline in the relative value of its currency on the foreign exchange market must be offset by a PRECEDING general rise in the cost of production. And this is without even taking into account the economy-weakening effects of the mal-investment caused by the monetary inflation needed to create the "price inflation" that ultimately leads to the sustainably-lower exchange rate. This is why high-inflation economies tend to be less competitive than low-inflation economies.

In the short-term, currency exchange rates regularly move counter to long-term fundamentals. Consequently, it is not uncommon for currencies with relatively slow rates of domestic purchasing-power loss to decline on the foreign exchange market over periods of several months or even longer. But even in the case where the decline in a currency's exchange rate is not due to a relatively high rate of domestic "price inflation" and is therefore temporary, a short-term economy-wide benefit will not be obtained unless the economy with the weakening currency is already running a trade surplus. To put it another way, an economy that imports more than it exports can't possibly achieve even a short-term benefit by manipulating money in a way that increases the prices of imports. The reason is that if an economy imports more than it exports, then any temporary benefit received by exporters due to a decline in the currency's foreign exchange value will be more than offset by higher prices paid within the non-exporting part of the economy. For example, the overall Japanese economy can't possibly benefit from the recent sharp decline in the Yen's exchange rate, even in the short-term, because Japan now imports more than it exports. A Japan-based car exporter may well gain a temporary advantage from the Yen's decline, but due to the rising cost of imported energy the car manufacturer's gain will be some other Japanese company's or individual's loss.

To further explain, a common argument in favour of exchange-rate manipulation goes something like this: "If imports become more expensive then consumers will buy less from foreign producers and more from local producers, thus creating a benefit for the local economy." This is an illogical argument. First, it is based on the assumption that local producers are ready to replace the products that are being imported, but this is usually not the case. Taking the topical example of Japan, it doesn't matter how high the prices of imported oil and LNG become, Japan is not going to increase its domestic production of oil and LNG. Second, even in the case where local producers are capable of providing the products that are being imported, if exchange-rate manipulation forces consumers to pay a higher price for a product then all it does is transfer wealth from some consumers to some producers within the economy. It doesn't result in an economy-wide increase in wealth.

All of which prompts the question: If lowering a currency's exchange rate can't possibly give an economy a sustainable advantage and in most cases can't even provide a temporary advantage, then why is exchange-rate reduction such a popular policy choice?

There are two main reasons. The first reason is that all sorts of harebrained theories are accepted wisdom in the intermingled worlds of economics and politics. For example, if a person mistakenly believes that the economy can be helped by an increase in government spending or by conjuring money out of nothing, it means that he/she doesn't look beyond the superficial short-term effects of policies and is therefore apt to mistakenly believe that the economy can be helped by lowering the currency's foreign exchange value. The second reason is that obtaining and holding-onto political power in a modern democracy involves making promises and payments to one group at the expense of another group, the goal being to gain more votes within the group that receives the benefit than are lost within the group that pays the benefit. Under this political system, lowering the exchange rate to help exporters can be an effective strategy because the receivers are easy to pinpoint and relatively small in number whereas the payers are spread throughout the economy and relatively large in number (the payers are often the amorphous mass known as "consumers"). This creates the potential to gain votes among the receivers without losing votes among the payers. Usually, the payers won't even realise that they are paying. 

Copper Update

The rising economic confidence of the past few months hasn't done much for the base metals. For example, the following chart shows that copper, arguably the most important of the base metals, ended last week near a 3-month low.

Copper's chart is interesting, because it reveals the potential for a big move within the next few months but doesn't clearly indicate the likely direction of the move. A daily close below $3.50 would point to a continuing decline down to the 2011 low of $3.00, while a daily close above $3.80 would point to a continuing rise to the 2011 high of around $4.50.



In their efforts to figure out the most likely future direction of the copper price, a lot of analysts monitor what's happening with reported copper inventories. For example, they monitor charts such as the one displayed below. The idea is that a rising inventory (increasing aboveground supply) points to a lower price, while a falling inventory (decreasing aboveground supply) points to a higher price. However, foresight can't be gained by looking at the same factors and interpreting these factors in the same way as almost everyone else in the market. That almost everyone who follows the copper market knows the inventory situation guarantees that the market has already done its best to factor the inventory situation into the current price.


                                  Chart Source: http://www.investmenttools.com/

The fundamentals that really matter are macroeconomic forces that are often difficult to predict. For copper and the other base metals, perhaps the most important of these forces is China's nominal economic growth. Is China's government going to promote faster growth in the supplies of money and credit, thus enabling another extraordinary bout of mal-investment and causing a surge in the demand for basic materials? Or will concerns about an "inflation" problem prompt China's policy-makers to tighten monetary conditions? If the answer to the first of these questions is yes then copper's next big move will probably be to the upside. If the answer to the second of these questions is yes then copper's next big move will probably be to the downside. Last week the market started leaning towards an affirmative answer to the second question.

We don't have an opinion on what China's policy-makers will do over the next few months. As a result, we remain "neutral" on copper and the other base metals.

The Stock Market

The March Cycle

The US stock market has had a strong tendency over the past 13 years to make an important high or low in March. For example, three of the four most important turning points of the past 13 years occurred during the month of March. We are referring to the major high of March-2000 and the major lows of March-2003 and March-2009. The only major turning point not to occur in March was the major high of October-2007. In addition, there was a multi-month high or low in March-2001 (low), March-2002 (high), March-2004 (high), March-2005 (high), March-2007 (low), March-2008 (low), and March-2011 (low).

At this stage it seems that if there is going to be a multi-month extreme in March-2013 it will be a high, but a low can't yet be ruled out. A sharp decline over the next two weeks would potentially create a low that holds for at least a few months.

Current Market Situation

A significant LOW in March-2013 can't yet be ruled out because the price action of the NASDAQ100 Index (NDX) suggests that a sharp decline over the next 2-3 weeks is a realistic possibility. The NDX dropped to support at 2700 last Thursday and then rebounded, which underlines the importance of this support. If 2700 is breached this week it could lead to a quick decline to longer-term support at 2450-2500. That's a big 'if', but it is one plausible outcome.



It's not just gold mining that has been in the doldrums. Gold has recently been by far the weakest sub-sector of the overall mining sector, but the following chart shows that the Diversified Metals and Mining Index (SPTMN) has been weak since early-2011 and is no higher today than it was in late-2009.

We are more keen on the gold miners than the non-gold miners, but a sharp stock market pullback over the next few weeks could create a good opportunity to 'go long' the non-gold miners via a major producer such as BHP or an ETF such as KOL or XME.



Fundamentally, the European banking sector is probably the weakest sector of the weakest economic region. This doesn't necessarily mean that the average European bank stock, as represented on the following daily chart by the EURO STOXX Banks Index (F7X), is about to commence a large decline. After all, this fundamental weakness didn't prevent these stocks from rallying strongly during the second half of last year. What it means is that the European banking sector can viewed as the proverbial "canary in the coal mine". As long as F7X is in an upward trend, the broad-based equity indices probably aren't going to suffer large declines.

Our interest is piqued by the fact that F7X has had a downward bias since late-December.

This week's important US economic events

Date Description
Monday Feb 25 Dallas Fed Mfg Survey
Tuesday Feb 26 Case-Shiller Home Price Index
New Home Sales
Consumer Confidence
Richmond Fed Mfg Index
Wednesday Feb 27 Durable Goods Orders
Pending Home Sales Index
Thursday Feb 28

Q4 GDP (revised)
Chicago PMI

Friday Mar 01 ISM Manufacturing Index
Personal Income and Spending
Motor Vehicle Sales
Consumer Sentiment
Construction Spending

Gold and the Dollar

Gold

Inflation Expectations

We refer to the difference between the yield on the 10-year T-Note and the yield on the 10-year TIPS (Treasury Inflation Protected Security) as the "expected CPI", because it indicates the future change in the CPI expected by the markets. Most people realise that the change in the CPI doesn't reflect the actual amount of dollar depreciation, which means that the value of the "expected CPI" generally won't provide an accurate indication of the markets' inflation expectations. However, the trend of the "expected CPI" should accurately reflect the trend of market-wide inflation expectations.

The following weekly Fullermoney.com chart shows that the "expected CPI" rose sharply at around the time of the Fed's "QE3" announcement (mid-September of last year). It has since flat-lined, despite another money-pumping program ("QE4") being introduced by the Fed in December. The message, here, is that the financial markets have come to the conclusion that the Fed is doing enough on the monetary front to support the financial system but not enough to cause an inflation problem. This conclusion will prove to be wrong, but the markets' expectations are what they are. If you want an explanation for why monetary inflation is boosting the broad stock market and doing nothing for the gold market, this is as good as any.



Current Market Situation

Last May the total speculative net-long position in COMEX gold futures reached its lowest level since the crash of 2008. The latest COT report shows that on Tuesday 19th February the total speculative net-long position was equal to last May's low, which means that it is now at a 4-year low.

Sentiment in the gold market continues to build a launching pad for a major advance, but last week's price action made it clear that the correction that began way back in August of 2011 is not complete. On long-term charts the correction still looks like a lengthy flat consolidation with a base at $1520-$1550. We acknowledge, though, that the probability of this base being breached before the start of the next big rally looks higher now than it did just two weeks ago. We didn't anticipate another gut-wrenching test of this long-term lateral support.



Looking back at the other near-vertical 2-3 week plunges in the US$ gold price that occurred over the past several years we noticed a consistency in the way that price bottoms were formed. The 2-3 week price plunge was almost always followed by a short rebound and then a decline that tested or slightly breached the low of the plunge, with the test of the low coming 2-4 weeks after the end of the plunge. For examples on the above chart refer to the price action in September-October of 2011, December of 2011 and May-June of 2012. If the plunge of the past two weeks follows this pattern then a tradable rebound will begin during the first half of March.

Gold Stocks

A test of the May-2012 low during the first half of this year became an even-money bet last December and a high-probability outcome during January. There was a question as to whether the test would occur during the first two months of the year or during the second quarter of the year, but as long as the test proved to be successful it would be correct to view the decline from the September-2012 peak as part of a lengthy bottoming pattern that started to form in May-2012.

Unfortunately, the test wasn't successful, as last Wednesday (20th February) the HUI closed well below its 373 low of May-2012. This tells us that the cyclical bear market in the gold sector didn't end last May, but it doesn't tell us when or where the bear market will end. Trend-following analysts will naturally predict much lower levels due to last week's breakdown, whereas other analysts will focus on the low valuations and/or the extent to which the market is 'oversold'.

There is such an obvious 'line in the sand' at around 373 that a quick move to well above this level would mark last week's breakdown as a 'head fake'. However, we are concerned that a reversal hasn't yet happened. Rather than plunging and then reversing course in a clear-cut manner, the HUI plunged below the 'line in the sand' last Wednesday and then traded sideways over the final two days of the week. This indicates that the crash might not have ended. It will almost certainly end soon, but even if it continues for just 1-2 more weeks it will result in much lower prices. A 1-2 week continuation is not our expectation, but it will remain a possibility until there is a clear-cut reversal. We would now view a daily close above 385 as evidence of such a reversal.

The following daily chart illustrates in two ways the extent to which the HUI is 'oversold'. First, the bottom section of the chart shows that the daily RSI was close to a 10-year low following last Wednesday's plunge. Second, the chart shows that the HUI has just touched the bottom of a moving-average (MA) envelope that with one major exception has always limited intermediate-term declines over the past 10 years. The exception occurred during August-October of 2008, when the HUI lost about 50% of its value after it first reached the bottom of this MA envelope.



GDXJ, a proxy for the junior end of the gold sector, was even more 'oversold' than the HUI at last week's low. GDXJ's daily RSI(14) got as low as 15 last week. It is rare for any index or ETF to reach such a low RSI.



Summarising the above: There is a high probability that the gold sector will reach a major bottom in the near future, but last week's break below the May-2012 low tells us that many owners of gold mining stocks are panicking. When market participants panic, absurdly low prices can quickly go even lower.

Regardless of what happens over the next couple of weeks, the gold-stock indices and ETFs are likely to trade a long way above their current levels within the next 6 months.

Currency Market Update

The top section of the following chart shows Canadian Dollar futures (the C$ relative to the US$) and the bottom section shows the C$ relative to the Australian Dollar (the C$/A$ cross rate).

Relative to the US$, the C$ has been weak over the past few months and has essentially traded sideways over the past three years. The bottom of its multi-year range is at 92.5-95.0.

We suspect that a test of major support at 92.5-95.0 is coming up. If there is a sharp stock market decline over the next few weeks then the test could happen in March. Otherwise, it probably won't happen until the second quarter of this year.

Relative to the A$, the C$ has been in a bear market since October of 2008. Although monetary inflation differentials usually don't have an immediate effect on currency exchange rates, the performance of the C$/A$ exchange rate since 2008 can be fully explained by the relative rates at which these currencies have been inflated. The reason is that for years prior to October of 2008 the year-over-year (YOY) rate of change in A$ supply was higher than the YOY rate of change in C$ supply, leading to the A$ becoming very over-valued relative to the C$ by mid-2008. This over-valuation was rapidly corrected during July-October of 2008. Then, in October-2008 Canada's monetary inflation rate moved above that of Australia and has remained above it ever since. This is undoubtedly part of the reason for the C$'s multi-year decline against the A$.

There is substantial downside risk in both the A$ and the C$ (relative to the US$), but this risk is unlikely to materialise until after the global stock market commences its next intermediate-term decline.

Update on Stock Selections

Notes: 1) To review the complete list of current TSI stock selections, logon at http://www.speculative-investor.com/new/market_logon.asp and then click on "Stock Selections" in the menu. When at the Stock Selections page, click on a stock's symbol to bring-up an archive of our comments on the stock in question. 2) The Small Stock Watch List is located at http://www.speculative-investor.com/new/smallstockwatch.html

Company news/developments for the week ended Friday 22nd February 2013:

[Note: FS = Feasibility Study, IRR = Internal Rate of Return, MD&A = Management Discussion and Analysis, M&I = Measured and Indicated, NAV = Net Asset Value, NPV(X%) = Net Present Value using a discount rate of X%, P&P = Proven and Probable, PEA = Preliminary Economic Assessment, PFS = Pre-Feasibility Study]

  *Almaden Minerals (AAU) advised that it has commenced a diamond drill program at its 100%-owned El Cobre porphyry copper-gold project in Veracruz State, Mexico. A single drill will be employed with the aim of completing between five and eight 500m+ holes.

El Cobre is at a very early stage of exploration, but shows considerable potential. It is probably AAU's second most important project (Tuligtic being by far the most important).

  *Dragon Mining (DRA.AX) announced that Agnico Eagle (AEM) had commenced drilling at the Hanhimaa gold project in Finland. DRA and AEM have an agreement under which AEM can earn a 70% stake in DRA's Hanhimaa project by spending 9M euros on exploration over 6 years.

  *Evolution Mining (EVN.AX) issued its half-yearly report for the period ended 31st December 2012. There was nothing of importance in this report that wasn't included in the quarterly activities report issued last month, although it is worth mentioning that the company introduced a dividend policy. In the future EVN plans to pay a cash dividend equal to 2% of its gold sales revenue.

It's good that EVN's management is thinking in terms of returning cash to shareholders in the form of regular dividends, but the amount of the currently-planned dividend is insignificant. For example, if the aforementioned dividend policy had been in place over the past 6 months then the dividend payment for this period would be less than 1c/share.

  *Golden Predator (GPD.TO) has changed its name to Americas Bullion Royalty Corp and its stock symbol to AMB. The change became effective last Friday, but we will use the old name and symbol in today's update.

GPD announced that its Brewery Creek project in Canada's Yukon has been delayed by government stupidity. The delay is due to the recent decision by the Yukon Environment & Socio Economic Assessment Board's ("YESAB") Dawson City Designated Office that it does not have the jurisdiction to assess the reactivation of the Brewery Creek project, and that the project must instead be reviewed by the YESAB Executive Committee. This appears to be an arbitrary last-minute change of mind that is not only contrary to what YESAB's Dawson City office had led GPD to believe for many months, but also contrary to the approval process via which other similar Yukon projects have recently been permitted.

The ramifications of the surprise YESAB decision aren't yet known. It could mean that Brewery Creek's development will have to be put on hold for several months while the permitting process is repeated, but hopefully a solution can be found.

Note that in addition to adversely affecting GPD's shareholders and employees, YESAB's bungle has adversely affected the Tr'ondek Hwech'in ("TH") -- the local community. The TH has been a staunch supporter of GPD's efforts to reactivate the Brewery Creek gold mine and will continue to work closely with GPD in relation to all aspects of the project, including the YESAB decision.

Although this is definitely bad news, it doesn't alter our opinion. The reason is that we are primarily interested in GPD's Nevada-based gold royalties. We estimate that the royalty assets are worth about $0.70/share, which means that we would perceive a lot of upside potential in the stock even if no value were assigned to Brewery Creek.

In other GPD-related developments, Bill Sheriff, the company's CEO, was again a buyer of the stock last week. Sheriff bought another 223,000 shares during the panic caused by the YESAB news and the sector-wide plunge.

  *Golden Star Resources (GSS) announced that scheduled maintenance at one of its mines had been extended from 4 days to 8 days. This is expected to reduce Q1 gold production by 4K ounces, but isn't expected to prevent the company from achieving its annual production guidance.

In a more normal market this news wouldn't have had a noticeable effect on the stock price, but the announcement came in the midst of a sector-wide panic last week and therefore initially had a much bigger effect than it deserved. However, GSS rebounded strongly from its Thursday morning trough and actually managed to achieve a small weekly gain.

  *Keegan Resources (KGN) had a lot of news last week. First, there was the announcement that the proposed KGN-PMV merger was not going to proceed. We addressed this in last week's Interim Update. Second, KGN confirmed that it was on track to complete the PFS for the Esaase project by the end of Q1 and that the PFS results would be published early in Q2. Third, KGN advised that it expected to complete the Esaase FS and permitting process in Q3 of 2013 with the aim of commencing mine construction in Q4-2013 and becoming a producer in 2015. This constitutes a materially shorter development timeline for Esaase than would have occurred if the merger with PMV had gone ahead. Fourth, the company announced that minor modifications to the planned ore processing method indicated that the average gold recovery at Esaase could be improved from 88% to 92%. This is very good news.

We would have preferred that the merger with PMV had gone ahead (because it made economic sense for both companies), but all things considered it was a positive week on the news front for KGN.

KGN's $205M cash hoard makes it a relatively low-risk exploration-stage gold miner in this ultra-challenging market environment.

  *Orvana Minerals (ORV.TO): It was reported on Friday that the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) has tentatively approved the last major permit needed for construction of ORV's Copperwood copper mine in Michigan. This is obviously good news, but from our perspective it isn't important news. At this stage we aren't assigning much value to the Copperwood project and would prefer that ORV kept this project 'on the backburner' until after the company had generated sufficient cash from its operating gold-copper mines to pay-off all debt and establish a sizeable 'cash cushion'.

Considering the lousy market in which it trades, ORV's price action continues to be strangely constructive.

  *Ramelius Resources (RMS.AX) issued its half-yearly report for the period ended 31st December 2012. There was nothing of importance in this report that wasn't included in the quarterly activities report issued last month. The only thing worth mentioning is that based on the quarterly report we thought that the company had working capital of $50M at 31st December, but the half-year report showed that it only had $46M.

RMS's balance sheet is healthy, but for it to remain so the company will soon have to start generating free cash-flow.

  *Sabina Gold and Silver (SBB.TO) reported an updated resource estimate for its Back River project. The new estimate increased the overall Back River gold resource by only 500K ounces -- from 6.0M to 6.5M. This is not the sort of resource revision that is going to excite the average market participant, which is why the stock price fell slightly during the hours following the news. However, the news was a lot better than suggested by the change in the total resource.

First, more than 100% of the resource increase was in the higher-quality M&I category (the M&I component increased from 4.0M to 4.6M ounces and the Inferred component declined from 2.0M to 1.9M ounces). Second, there was an increase in the average grade of the deposit. Of particular note, the average grade of the M&I resource increased from 5.6-g/t to 6.0-g/t. Third, the new resource estimate is based on more conservative assumptions and is therefore more robust than earlier resource estimates. For example, the entire open-pit portion of the resource now uses a 1.0-g/t cut-off grade whereas part of this portion previously used a 0.76-g/t cut-off, and the cut-off grade applied to the underground portion of the project's resource has doubled from 2.0-g/t to 4.0-g/t.

In summary, the resource re-estimate reported last week constituted a much greater increase in quality than in quantity. This might not matter to the typical retail investor, but it definitely matters to the large-cap mining companies that are potential future acquirers of the Back River project.

The next important milestone for SBB is expected to be the completion of the Back River PFS in Q3-2013. In the mean time there will be plenty of drilling news.

Chart Sources

Charts appearing in today's commentary are courtesy of:

http://stockcharts.com/index.html
http://bigcharts.marketwatch.com/
http://www.fullermoney.com/



 
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